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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID LEE BARRETT, 
Case No. 890435-CA 
Defendant/Appellant Category No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DAVID LEE BARRETT 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEEDINGS 
This case arose as Defendant was proceeding northbound on 
Interstate 15 between the north and south Nephi exits. 
Defendant's vehicle, and the vehicle preceding Defendant on the 
roadway, were simultaneously pulled over by Utah Highway Patrol 
Trooper Paul Mangelson who, although busy with another motorist 
when Defendant passed, gave chase and stopped both vehicles for 
allegedly speeding. Trooper Mangelson made a consent search of 
the first vehicle and found marijuana in the trunk. He then 
requested and was denied consent to search the Barrett vehicle, 
reached into Barrett's car, took the keys, and effected a search 
of the trunk discovering sealed luggage wherein marijuana was 
discovered. 
Prior to requesting consent to search and then conducting a 
warrantless and nonconsentual search, the police officer 
received and reviewed the registration documents for the Barrett 
automobile. The vehicle was improperly registered, which the 
officer testified would justify his seizing and impounding the 
car. Notwithstanding the ability to seize and impound the 
vehicle, the officer conducted his search without notifying 
dispatch or requesting backup or making any other contact. 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the 
search, on the grounds that probable cause was lacking, a search 
warrant was available and necessary, and no exigent 
circumstances existed for the warrantless search of the 
automobile. Defendant's Motion was denied and this appeal 
follows. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendant's issues on appeal are whether exigent 
circumstances and probable cause were present to justify a 
warrantless search of Defendant's vehicle. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS FACTS 
Trooper Mangelson estimated the vehicles were "a couple of 
hundred" feet apart when they were stopped. (T.7) Suppression 
exhibits 1, 2, and 3, (not in record, but requested in 
Supplementary Record on Appeal attached hereto as exhibit 1) , 
clearly show the vehicles to be parked within 10 feet of each 
other. See also Barrett's testimony where he said the vehicles 
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were "very close," within 10 to 15 feet of each other. (T. 51-
52) 
Although Respondent states that trooper Mangelson testified 
he did not open the garbage bag containing marijuana from the 
front vehicle prior to his search of Defendant's vehicle (Br. of 
Res. at 4), the following exchange took place at the suppression 
hearing: 
Q: Now as I understood the first thing you 
did is you searched Mr. Sandiford's car? 
A: Yes, that is correct. 
Q: Opened the package, opened the trunk? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Opened the package in the trunk until 
you got to the Marijuana? 
A « IcS • • • • 
Q: And when you first approached David, the 
defendant in this case, the Sandiford trunk 
was opened and the Marijuana bag was open? 
A: I believe it was... as far as I can 
remember.... 
Q: And so there was some question in your 
mind whether you were smelling that 
Marijuana from Sandiford's car wasn't there? 
A: Well it entered my mind yes. 
Q: And in effect it entered your mind to 
the point where you represented that to Mr. 
Barrett? 
A: I did yes. (T. 20-21). 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED JUSTIFYING A 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S AUTOMOBILE. 
Unsupported by any factual discussion, the trial court 
determined "exigent circumstances" existed which justified the 
warrantless search of Defendant's vehicle. This was based on 
the Court's finding that "this is a vehicle on the highway that 
could have easily been driven away should the officer leave or 
the officer leave and attempt to make contact with the Justice 
of the Peace to obtain a search warrant." (T. 83) This 
perfunctory and insufficient finding of fact leaves the 
Appellate Court in a position to apply a "correction of error" 
standard. State v. Johnson, 771 P. 2d 326, 327 (Utah Court Ap. 
1989) (citations omitted). The trial Court failed to even 
consider Defendant's two major points, that a telephonic (or 
radio) search warrant was available to the officer, and that he 
had a right to seize the automobile or arrest the Defendant, 
thereby precluding movement of Defendant's automobile. 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE ARGUED AT THE TRIAL COURT: 
Respondents have failed to address a lack of exigent 
circumstances based on the officer's right to seize the 
automobile. They argue: "Defendant further argues that because 
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the VIN of the car itself did not match the VIN on its 
registration, Trooper Mangelson could have seized and impounded 
the car prior to his search. However, Defendant did not make 
this argument at the trial Court. Therefore, an appellate Court 
will not consider it on appeal." (Br. of Res. 12) 
This is an absolute misstatement of the facts and issues 
before the trial Court. This issue of the VIN numbers and the 
opportunity to seize the car pending a search warrant is briefed 
at page three and page four of Defendant's Memorandum in Support 
of his Motion to Suppress. 
In addition, Defendant argued at the time of the 
suppression hearing "I think that [Mangelson7s] testimony has 
very clearly shown that a vehicle which is improperly licensed, 
a vehicle which is suspected of being stolen is a vehicle which 
is subject to impound and by being subject to impound the 
exigent circumstances evaporate. The car is now under control 
of the police. They now have an opportunity to obtain a search 
warrant and search the automobile. That is the issue before the 
Court with regard to this evidence. (T. 44-45) Therefore, the 
issue is properly preserved for appellate review. 
NO EXCEPTION TO WARRANT REQUIREMENTS WERE PRESENT: 
In State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court outlined the exceptions to the warrant 
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requirement. Those exceptions are: (1) consent searches, (2) 
searches and seizures made in hot pursuit, (3) searches and 
seizures of contraband in public areas, (4) seizure of evidence 
in plain view after a lawful intrusion, (5) searches and 
seizures incident to lawful arrest under exigent circumstances, 
and (6) searches and seizures of automobiles under exigent 
circumstances. Id. at 179 
No such exceptions were present in this case. This was not 
a consent search. The investigating officer and the Defendant 
both testified that consent was denied. Neither do the 
specifics of exceptions 2, 3, 4, and 5 apply to this case. The 
investigating officer based his search under the exceptions of 
number 6, searches and seizures of automobiles under exigent 
circumstances. 
This case is indistinguishable from Coolidae and Griffin. 
The State has urged that this case is distinguishable from the 
doctrine announced in Coolidae v. New Hampshire and State v. 
Griffin. In neither of those cases were the Carroll - Chambers 
exigencies present. Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court 
appropriately found the automobile exception irrelevant. 
In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), on the basis of 
information provided by witnesses to an armed robbery, the 
occupants of a station wagon were arrested within an hour 
following the crime. The station wagon was driven to the police 
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station, after which a thorough search of the car uncovered two 
revolvers and other items which were admitted into evidence 
against petitioner at his trial for two robberies. The delayed 
search of the car could not be upheld as incident to arrest, so 
the Court quickly moved to the question of whether the search 
could be justified under the Carroll rule. 
Carroll, nor other cases in this Court 
require or suggest that in every conceivable 
circumstance the search of an auto even with 
probable cause may be made without the extra 
protection for privacy that a warrant 
affords. But the circumstances that 
furnished probable cause to search a 
particular auto for particular articles are 
most often unforeseeable; moreover, the 
opportunity to search is fleeting since a 
car is readily moveable. Where this is 
true, as in Carroll and the case before us 
now, if an effective search is to be made at 
any time, either the search must be made 
immediately without a warrant or the car 
itself must be seized and held without a 
warrant for whatever period is necessary to 
obtain a warrant for the search. 
Thus it can be seen that the automobile exception is based 
upon a car being readily moveable. In the case of David 
Barrett, his car was subject to immediate seizure and impound by 
the police, as testified by the investigating police officer, 
due to the fact that the serial number on the car did not match 
the serial number on the registration. (T. 27) 
In this case, it should be noted that Defendant was subject 
to arrest for committing a misdemeanor in the police officer's 
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presence (speeding, a Class B Misdemeanor)1, and the vehicle was 
subject to impound for having improper registration. (T. 27) 
Therefore, none of the Carroll - Chambers exigencies were 
present in this case and the investigating police officer would 
have had ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant. 
When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged, it is 
the State's burden to demonstrate the exigent circumstances 
justifying it. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). 
The State has failed to show any exigent circumstances 
whatsoever in David Barrett's case. 
CONTINUED SEARCH OF A SEALED CONTAINER: 
The exigent circumstances doctrine set forth in Carroll was 
further defined and expanded in the case of Cardwell v. Lewis, 
417 U.S. 483 (1974), wherein the Court stated that traditionally 
"[o]ne has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle 
because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as 
ones residence or as the repository of personal effects." The 
same cannot be said of luggage found within an automobile. The 
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1 (1977), suppressed evidence found in a locked footlocker 
taken from the trunk of Chadwick's automobile. The Court held 
in part that the government was in error in contending "that the 
rationale of our automobile search cases demonstrates the 
1
 Utah Code Ann. §77-7-2 (1986) 
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reasonableness permitting warrantless searches of luggage." The 
Court then concluded that the footlocker in this case was unlike 
a vehicle in terms of either mobility or expectation of privacy: 
The factors which diminish the privacy 
aspects of an automobile do not apply to 
respondent's footlocker. Luggage contents 
are not open to public view, except as a 
condition to border entry or common carrier 
travel; nor is luggage subject to regular 
inspections and official scrutiny on a 
continuing basis. Unlike an automobile, 
whose primary function is transportation, 
luggage is intended as a repository of 
personal effects. In sum, a persons 
expectations of privacy in personal luggage 
are substantially greater than in an 
automobile. 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed. 
2d 538 (1977). 
In the case of David Barrett, as in the case of Chadwick, 
"there was not the slightest danger that the footlocker or its 
contents could of been removed before a valid search warrant 
could be obtained," and precisely the same is true of the sealed 
container in the Barrett vehicle. 
It was previously argued to the trial Court (T. 68-69) that 
absent exigent circumstances, the police must obtain a warrant 
before searching a closed container found in a vehicle even if 
they have probably cause to believe the container contains 
contraband. State v. Turget, (Ore.); Robins v. California, 101 
Supreme Court 2841; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 
Supreme Court 2586; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 
Supreme Court 2476; State v. Grota, 591 P. 2d 1354 and State v. 
Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425 (Utah Ct.App 1988). The police officer 
was asked at the suppression hearing: 
Q: And so you do not know whether at the 
time of this arrest you where authorized by 
any department policies, supervisors, county 
attorney or anybody else to conduct searches 
of sealed containers is that correct? 
A: Well there is a couple of court rulings 
on it yes. 
Q: I am not asking for court rulings I am 
asking for your guidelines? 
A: I don't have any guidelines no. 
Q: So you did this on your own? 
A: I did it on my own. 
Q: No guidelines came into place? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: Okay just so I feel like we have covered 
everything we are not talking about this 
evidence being found in plain view was in a 
locked trunk that you opened with a key and 
so you had a sealed container isn't that 
correct? 
A: That is correct. (T. 36) 
The situation presented is not unlike the situation in 
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970), in which a 
unanimous Court held that the proper course of action, given 
probable cause to search packages placed in the mails, was to 
withhold routing and delivery of the packages for the brief 
period necessary to obtain a search warrant. 
Rather, the traditional Fourth Amendment Lore must be 
applied, which is "that the police must, whenever practicable 
obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures." 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
Indeed, the doctrine annunciated in Chambers and White begs 
the very question to be answered by the Court in this case, that 
is, whether the officer was justified in conducting a 
warrantless search of the vehicle at the time of the stop. 
Again, the general rule stands that "warrantless searches are 
unreasonable per se unless they fall within a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." 
AVAILABILITY OF TELEPHONIC SEARCH WARRANT: 
Respondent has failed to address the availability of a 
radio or telephonic search warrant, stating instead that State 
v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987), should not apply but rather 
the well established "automobile exception" standard should 
apply. 
The police officer in this case testified that he knew that 
he could obtain a search warrant by radio or telephone, and that 
procedure was available to him. He testified that he just 
didn't do it because he really didn't feel it was necessary (T. 
2 5-26) . The State has claimed that Ashe is factually 
distinguishable from this case, and Defendant agrees. In Ashe 
exigent circumstances were present, in the present case no 
11 
exigent circumstances were present as previously argued. In 
addition, the State was not only unable to prove unavailability 
of a search warrant, the police officer testified that such 
procedure was available to him. He simply chose, in his own 
discretion, not to use that procedure. 
The State is wrong in claiming that the practicality of 
obtaining a warrant is not an element of its ability to search 
without a warrant. The "practicality" determination was express 
in the Carroll doctrine, and as the United States Supreme Court 
noted- "the police must, whenever practicable obtain advance 
judicial approval of searches and seizures." Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968) . Therefore, the warrantless search in this case 
was unreasonable. 
Many things have changed since the United States Supreme 
Court announced the automobile exception in the case of Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Telephonic and radio 
warrants were not available at that time. Assuming, only for 
the sake of argument, that such exceptions eliminate any need 
for a warrant, the elements of the automobile exception do not 
apply in this case. First it should be noted that the reasoning 
in Carroll concerned the need to permit a warrantless search 
"where it is not practical to secure a warrant." While the 
State relies upon the Carroll -Chambers doctrine in this case, 
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they then claim that "practicality" is not a proper 
consideration. 
INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS AND THE TELEPHONIC WARRANT: 
The State further says that Defendant failed to raise or 
argue the issue of independent state grounds at the trial level, 
and is therefore precluded from raising the issue at this time. 
A issue is properly preserved for appeal if it is raised in the 
trial Court and an opportunity to rule thereon has been 
provided. 
Both Federal and State consitutional grounds were raised in 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress in this case. This issue of the 
telephonic search warrant and its application under Utah Law was 
likewise argued to the trial Court. (See Appellant's Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Suppress; and T. 69-70). 
It should again be noted, as provided in Appellate's 
opening brief, that our Supreme Court has urged that "the 
government should actively encourage its law enforcement agents 
to seek search warrants whenever possible and by any available 
means provided by statute•" State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 
1987) . Justices Durham and Zimmerman urged that the prosecution 
must prove unavailability of a telephone warrant. This theory 
was not opposed by the majority in Ashe because they found 
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exigent circumstances which would lead to the immediate 
destruction of evidence if a search warrant were to be obtained• 
POINT II 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT A SEARCH IN THIS 
CASE WAS LACKING. 
Probable cause must be viewed objectively. The subjective 
belief of the officer that he had probable cause, "while 
relevant to whether probable cause existed..., does not control 
the issue." People v. Gallardo, 112 111. App. 3d 764, 68 (1st 
District 1983) . It has been held "in his actions on the night 
in question, [the officer] apparently acted in good faith, but 
good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were 
the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would 
evaporate..." Murray v. State Ex Rel. Tidwell, 423 So.2d 246, 
250 (Ala. Civ.App. 1982). 
REFUSAL TO CONSENT: 
In support of his determination that he could search 
Defendants vehicle, the police officer stated that Defendant 
refused consent to search his automobile and that made the 
police officer suspicious (T. 14) . However, refusal to grant 
consent cannot be used as an aid in showing probable cause. 
State v. Wise, 72 Or. App. 58, 695 P.2d 68, 71 n. 3. An adverse 
inference cannot be drawn at trial from refusal to consent. 
Barges v. State, 489 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska 1971); U.S. v. 
Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350-53 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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NERVOUSNESS: 
The police officer further testified that his probable 
cause was based on the Defendant's nervousness (T. 20) . 
However, as previously briefed to this Court, nervousness is not 
a proper determination to establish probable cause. State v. 
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1988); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah 1988). 
PROFILE: 
The State urges that Defendant appeared to be traveling in 
tandem with another vehicle, and that met a drug courier profile 
familiar to trooper Mangelson (Br. of Res. 9) . However, the 
police officer stated, and the county attorney argued, that 
there were no profile aspects to this stop, nor that David 
Barrett met any profile. The county attorney specifically 
stated "there was nothing, no evidence offered that he had when 
he was observing the vehicle that it met a type of profile, that 
they were hispanic or those types of things that we have heard 
numerous times in this Court..." (T. 61). 
The State went on to say that traveling tandem was "a drug 
courier practice familiar to trooper Mangelson," which is a 
total misstatement of the evidence. Trooper Mangelson testified 
that in all of his years as a police officer and highway patrol 
trooper, he had only had one occasion where two vehicles were 
traveling together in a drug courier situation (T. 10). This is 
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in light of 20 years experience, thousands of arrests, and in 
1988 alone, the trooper made 176 arrests (T. 30) . Regardless of 
what the State now argues in its brief, this was not a drug 
courier profile well known to officer Mangelson. 
The other observations of trooper Mangelson likewise show 
this to be an innocent stop. Both Sandiford and Defendant 
Barrett stated that they were not traveling together (T. 7) . 
Defendant was asked if he had any marijuana in his car and he 
replied in the negative (T. 7). The officer testified he didn't 
smell the odor of burnt marijuana around the Barrett vehicle, 
nor was there any evidence or contraband in the passenger 
compartment of Defendant's car (T. 24) . There was no evidence 
of any criminal activity in the passenger compartment of 
Barrett's automobile (T. 25) . While the prosecution argued at 
the suppression hearing that the totality of circumstances would 
support probable cause, the Court should see that the totality 
of the circumstances indicate that Defendant was involved in no 
criminal activity whatsoever. 
THE ALLEGED SMELL OF RAW MARIJUANA: 
The State argues the search of Barrett's vehicle was 
justified because the trooper allegedly smelled marijuana. 
However, it should be noted that at the suppression hearing the 
police officer testified that he did not know that Defendant 
possessed marijuana (T. 23) and that he thought the smell of 
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marijuana could have been coming from Sandiford's automobile (T. 
21) . 
The State now claims that trooper Mangelson "did not unpack 
the marijuana from the front vehicle, and no testimony exists 
stating that he did unpack the marijuana." (Br. of Res. 6). As 
provided in Appellant's reply to the State's facts, the trooper 
testified at the suppression hearing that he opened Sandiford's 
trunk, and opened the package in the trunk until he got to the 
marijuana, and when he first approached David Barrett, the 
Sandiford trunk was open and the marijuana bag was open and on 
the road. (Supra at 3; T. 20-21). 
While the State argues some with the packaging and odor 
suppression contained in the bundled marijuana, there is simply 
no dispute that the marijuana was packaged inside six layers of 
plastic, with baking soda, which was packaged inside the large 
duffel bag (T. 50). Defendant testified "I couldn't smell it. 
I couldn't smell it when we took it Wyoming and it was sitting 
right in my lap on the plane." (T. 51). 
The findings of fact by the trial Court included the 
statement "the air was filled with the smell of marijuana..." 
(T. 83). If the air was filled with the smell of marijuana then 
it must have come from the 601bs. of marijuana on the road next 
to the Sandiford vehicle. To accept the conclusion that the 
marijuana was contained in the Barrett automobile simply exceeds 
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the bounds of human reason. The police officer had stated the 
he did not know Barrett possessed marijuana and that he thought 
the smell of marijuana may have been coming from the Sandiford 
vehicle. The State cites this Court to State v. Bartlev, 124 
Ut.Adv.Rep. 40 and sets forth the three prong test established 
by this Court. One of those elements is that the object could 
be plainly smelled. Under the facts of Bartlev, drip gas is 
"rank in odor." Although the odor of drip gas was considered in 
Bartley, many factors added into the probable cause of that stop 
and search, including recent thefts of drip gas in the area; the 
late hours; the infrequently traveled roads; report of potential 
theft activity by those with knowledge of legal gas transfers; 
the presence of trucks with empty tanks headed into the area; 
the transportation of drip gas by a typical means; the lack of a 
retail market for the sale drip gas; and the fact that the 
vehicles when seen were "lugged down and moving slowing as if 
heavily laden." The rank and unique odor of drip gas was only 
an element of the probable cause in that case. 
The State goes on to cite several cases wherein the smell 
of raw, rather than burned marijuana constituted probable cause 
for a warrantless search and seizure. The State cites United 
States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 397 (1974), however the State 
neglects to mention that the issue in the Johnson case was the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in Johnson's luggage. The 
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State cites several other cases, wherein raw marijuana was 
smelled, all of which are border search cases. Since all of 
these cases have in common that they were border patrol cases, 
the following quote is appropriate which is taken from the case 
of United States v. Ravera, 595 F.2d 1095, 1097-98 (1979), which 
has been cited so favorably by the State. 
At the outset, we note that customs patrol 
officers are not, "like local or state 
police, general guardians of the public 
peace." United States v. Jackson, 423 F.2d 
506, 508 (9th Cir. 1970).Customs agents are 
authorized to prevent the importation of 
aliens and contraband into the United 
States. See United States v. Soria, 519 
F.2d 1060, 1062 (5th Cir. 1975). Congress 
has granted customs officials broad 
statutory authority to stop and search 
vehicles for aliens and contraband. See 19 
U.S.C. §482, 1581, 1582 (1976). 
If this Court validates the search of David Barrett on 
these flimsy and specious grounds, this Court endorses and 
encourages law enforcement activity and action which will 
nullify our constitutional protections against unreasonable 
search and seizure. 
CONCLUSION 
The warrantless search of David Barrett's vehicle does not 
come within the automobile exception to the search warrant 
requirement. No exigent circumstances were present on the 
several grounds stated to this Court. Barrett could have been 
seized, the automobile could have been seized, or the police 
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officer could have obtained a telephonic or radio search 
warrant. 
A telephonic or radio search warrant would provide a 
reasonable and proper means to check the unfettered discretion 
of police officers in the field. The officer testified that 
obtaining a warrant in such a way would be available to him, and 
therefore it was not impractical nor unreasonable. This Court 
should endorse the concept that a search warrant should be 
obtained if practical and that if not so done the evidence 
should be suppressed. 
Finally, the probable cause giving rise to this search is 
insufficient. Should this Court hold otherwise, it will license 
and encourage the rampant and unfettered abuse of the public 
rights against unreasonable search and seizure by maverick 
police officers in the field. Indeed, based on the facts 
supporting this search, and those elements recognized by law, 
there was no more than a slight possibility of discovering 
marijuana in Defendant's vehicle. 
The evidence discovered in the unreasonable search of 
Defendant's vehicle should be suppressed and this case should be 
remanded to the trial Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /?- day of March, 1990. 
JAMEjS^ G. CLARK 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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EXHIBIT 1 
JAMES G. CLARK, USB #3637 
Attorney for 
96 East 100 South 
Provo, UT 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-6092 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SUPPLEMENTARY DESIGNATION 
OF RECORD ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID LEE BARRETT, Case No. 182-D 
Defendant. Judge: Boyd L. Park 
f 
TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
This case is currently on appeal before the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Record in the case has been transmitted to the 
Court of Appeals, but upon review of that Record, some items are 
missing. 
Please prepare and designate a Supplementary Record on 
Appeal in this case and enclose to the Utah Court of Appeals 
copies of the photographs admitted into evidence during the 
Suppression hearing which was held in this case. If you have 
any questions, please feel free to contact me. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 2$-* day of February, 1990. 
4f** ,.r 
JAMEjf G. CLARK 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Supplementary Designation of Record on Appeal, 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
David B. Thompson 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
DATED AND SIGNED this ^fS^dav of February, 1990. 
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